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Over the past decade there has been increasing interest in the role of insti-
tutions in the financial and real activities of the corporate sector. That interest
is most clearly reflected in the plethora of models on imperfect information
that have recently appeared in the finance literature. Several attempts have
been or are currently being made to establish the empirical significance of
these models for the financial behavior of firms. This volume reports the re-
sults of a number of such studies. However, a majority of this work is confined
to one country, namely the United States, and examines only a small segment
of a country's total financial system at any one time. It is therefore difficult to
judge the broader significance of these models for the overall functioning of a
financial system and to determine the extent to which they are relevant to
different countries.
It is well known that there are significant variations in the structure of dif-
ferent countries' financial systems. Since Marshall there has been much dis-
cussion about the role of banks in the German financial system. Schumpeter,
Gerschenkron, and Cameron all pointed to banks as an engine of growth of
the German economy. More recently, similar consideration has been given to
the role of banks in the Japanese economy and contrasts have been drawn
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between the importance of banks and securities markets in Japanese and
Anglo-Saxon financial systems, respectively.
1
Prima facie, banking systems would be expected to avoid some of the in-
formation deficiencies associated with securities markets. A primary rationale
for the existence of banks is that they perform screening and monitoring func-
tions that individual investors can only undertake at high cost. Resource allo-
cation, credit availability, and terms of loans may all, therefore, be superior
under a bank-based than a market financial system. On the other hand, trans-
action costs may be lower in the absence of intermediation, and taxation may
militate in favor of market-based sources of capital.
There are then several factors that finance theory suggests should influence
the financing patterns of different countries' corporate sectors. The purpose of
this paper is to compare the industry financing of eight developed countries
and to evaluate these patterns in the context of alternative theories of corporate
finance. International comparison of the financing of industry is a familiar
subject. However, it is probably fair to say that, to date, it has only shed
limited light on the functioning of different financial systems. In large part
this is due to the unreliability of the underlying data. There are, for example,
well-known problems associated with international comparisons of corporate
sector gearing: the valuation of assets, the treatment of reserves and goodwill,
and the double counting of intrasector flows all present serious difficulties.
The extent to which such inconsistencies can be overcome by ad hoc correc-
tions is questionable.
One justification for a reexamination of this subject at this time is that more
reliable methods of comparison have been developed that overcome many of
the problems that have afflicted previous studies. Problems remain but the
degree of comparability reported in this paper is almost certainly greater than
that of previous studies and probably about as great as existing data allow the
researcher to achieve at an aggregate level.
The results suggest 10 stylized facts about corporate finance. These concern
forms of finance in different countries and the relation between different forms
of finance over time. The stylized observations are reported in Section 12.2 of
the paper. In Section 12.3, alternative theories of corporate finance are dis-
cussed, and their relevance to explaining the observed financing patterns is
considered. This is not supposed to be a test of alternative theories, merely an
examination of the extent to which they are consistent with aggregate financ-
ing patterns in different countries.
Theory and observation bear directly on many of the issues that have been
central to policy debates about financial systems. In particular, there is cur-
rently much discussion about the relative merits of banks and markets for
promoting economic growth. As noted above, banks have traditionally been
regarded as central to the promotion of economic growth. More recently, dis-
illusionment with the role of banks in developing countries has intensified in
the face of widespread corruption and bank failures. The World Bank (1989)309 Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development
has, as a consequence, advocated the use of both securities markets and banks
in promoting economic growth.
Likewise, as the emergence of a unified market in 1992 promises to create
a high degree of homogeneity across the financial systems of member states,
the strengths and weaknesses of different financial systems have been brought
to the fore of policy discussions. Section 12.4 considers the implications of
both empirical observations and theoretical models for the relative merits of
securities markets and banks in promoting economic growth.
12.2 The Financing of Industry in Eight Countries
There are two sources of information available for studies of aggregate cor-
porate financing patterns in different countries. The first is national flow-of-
funds statements. These are records of flows between different sectors of an
economy and between domestic and overseas residents. The relevant state-
ment for this exercise is flows to and from nonfinancial enterprises. The sec-
ond source is company accounts. These are constructed on an individual firm
basis but are often aggregated or extrapolated to industry or economy levels.
Both sources have their merits and deficiencies. In theory, flow-of-funds
statistics provide a comprehensive coverage of transactions between sectors.
Company accounts are only available for a sample, often quite small, of a
country's total corporate sector. However, the data that are employed in com-
pany accounts are usually more reliable than flow-of-funds. As Appendix A
describes, flow-of-funds are constructed from a variety of different sources
that are rarely consistent. As a consequence, statistical adjustments are re-
quired to reconcile entries.
As described in Mayer (1987, 1988) and Appendix B to this paper, the
methodology employed in the Centre for Economic Policy Research Study of
the Financing of Industry differs in several respects from that used by previous
researchers. Greater emphasis is placed on flows of finance instead of stocks.
Figures are recorded on a net (of accumulation of equivalent financial assets)
as well as a gross funding basis. Financing proportions are aggregated over
different time periods using a weighted as well as a simple average of individ-
ual years' proportions. Appendix B argues that these procedures achieve a
greater degree of international comparability than has been available hitherto.
Tables 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 report weighted and unweighted average fi-
nancing proportions for the five countries of the international study (France,
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and for Canada,
Finland, and Italy using flow-of-funds statistics. Table 12.1 reports un-
weighted averages of net financing as a proportion of capital expenditures and
stock building. Table 12.2 shows weighted averages of net financing using
straight line depreciation over 16 years from 1970 to 1985. Table 12.3 records
unweighted averages of gross financing as a proportion of total sources of
finance.













































































































Source: OECD Financial Statistics.
Note: Numbers are percentages.
"Net financing is shown as a proportion of capital expenditures and stock building. Gross financing is a
proportion of total sources.
bFor Canada, mortgages are included in loans, foreign investments are included in other, and capital
transfers are included in retentions.
cData on Finland refer to the period 1969-84. Errors in the OECD statistics have required that the
statistical adjustment be altered as follows: 1971, DM 2 billion and 1973, +DM 89 billion.
dThere is no statistical adjustment in German accounts. Funds placed with insurance companies and
building and loans associations are included in loans.
eThe Italian statistical adjustment was reduced by Lit2,070 billion in 1974 to make accounts balance.
Trade credit is not recorded as a separate item in Italian flow-of-funds.
f Japanese flow-of-funds do not report retentions. The ratio of external to internal financing of Japanese
enterprises has been obtained by applying proportions recorded in aggregate company accounts for the
period 1972-84, as shown in tables 12.4 and 12.5. The Japanese figures therefore have to be treated
with particular caution. Short-term securities are included in bonds.
8United Kingdom statistics refer to private enterprises only; were public enterprise to be included then
entries would read as follows: retentions, 91.9; capital transfers, 5.7; short-term securities, 1.3; loans,
11.7; trade credit, -.7; bonds, -.9, shares, -2.5; other, 2.1; statistical adjustment, -8.5.
hThe following modifications were made to the U.S. statistical adjustment to make accounts balance (in
millions of dollars): 1970, -1; 1971, -3; 1973, +3; 1975, +1; 1976, -2; 1979, +2; 1981, -1;
1982, +1; 1983, -2; 1984, -1. Capital transfers are included under retentions in U.S. accounts.
Acquisitions of central government short-term securities are not shown separately from bonds and have
been subtracted from issues of bonds in table 12.2 below.
Observation 1. Retentions are the dominant source of finance in all coun-
tries.
The United Kingdom has the highest proportion of retentions (107% ex-
cluding public enterprises, 97% including public enterprises on a weighted
net financing basis). Italy has the lowest, but, even here, over half of invest-
ment in physical assets and stocks is funded from retentions. This is not just a
consequence of the procedure of netting uses of finance from sources. Even
on a gross basis U.K. corporations obtain just over 70% of their total sources
from retentions and U.S. corporations just under 70%.C 3 p on
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Observation 2. There are some marked variations in self-financing ratios
across countries. In the United Kingdom and the United States, more than
three-quarters of investment is funded from retentions. In Finland, France,
Japan, and Italy, appreciably more is raised externally. Canada and Germany
lie somewhere between the two groups.
Observation 3. In no country do companies raise a substantial amount of
finance from securities markets.
Summing together short-term securities, bonds, and shares reveals that the
largest amount raised in securities markets is 19% in Canada on a gross basis
(i.e., as a proportion of total sources) and 13% on a net basis in the United
States. In Germany and the United Kingdom, net amounts raised from these
three sources were negative and gross amounts were only 3% in Germany and
8% in the United Kingdom. Only in Canada and the United States do bond
markets raise a significant proportion of external finance for industry.
Observation 4. Banks are the dominant source of external finance in all
countries.
Observation 5. Bank finance is particularly pronounced in France, Italy,
and Japan. It represents a surprisingly small proportion of German corporate
financing.
Bank finance accounts for approximately 40% of gross sources in France,
Italy, and Japan. In Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, it
only contributes around 20% of total sources. Netting off deposits, this falls
to 8% in the United Kingdom. Rather strikingly, then, there is no support from
these figures for the commonly held view that German banks contribute a
substantial amount to the financing of their industry (see Carrington and Ed-
wards 1979).
Comparing the gross and net financing tables demonstrates some of the
problems associated with interpreting gross funding figures. In some coun-
tries, trade credit appears to be an important source of finance, in particular in
Finland (see table 12.3). But much of this is intracorporate sector and does
not contribute to total net financing. Table 12.1 correctly records that, overall,
nonfinancial enterprises are suppliers of credit to other sectors, in particular
to consumers.
Comparing tables 12.1 and 12.3 reveals that U.K. enterprises have been
particularly heavy purchasers of financial assets. This has been primarily in
the form of deposits, but purchases of shares have also been large. Acquisi-
tions of financial assets in the United States mainly take the form of intrasector
flows of trade credit and purchases of domestic shares and overseas assets.
The quality of some flow-of-funds data is questionable. Statistical adjust-
ments reveal inconsistencies between series, and the coverage of some items,
in particular trade credit, is known to be inadequate. U.K. data are particu-
larly deficient in this respect. Table 12.1 recorded the fact that the statistical
adjustment averaged 13% of gross investment over the period 1970-85—ap-



























































Source: Company accounts as reported in OECD Financial Statistics.
Note: Numbers are percentages.
Table 12.5 Unweighted Average Gross Financing of Nonfinancial Corporations
Finland France Japan United States
Period 1975-84 1976-84 1972-84 1970-85
Retentions 41.3 36.1 33.7 64.6
Capital transfers 1.0 .6 N.A. .0





Loans 34.5 ' ' 36.4 12.5
Trade credit 13.0 25.4 15.0 10.4
Bonds .6 w6 2.1 12.5
Shares 4.3 ' ' 4.9 4.0
Other 4.6 .0 7.8 -.2
Statistical adjustment -1.6 .0 .0 -5.2
Total 99.1 100.1 99.9 99.8
Tables 12.4 and 12.5 repeat the financing proportion exercise using com-
pany accounting data where they are available. There is a strong similarity in
the financing patterns that emerge from the two sources of data. However,
there are a few differences. Bank loans are more significant in Finland but
much less significant in the United States than suggested by the flow-of-funds
data. Bonds are even more significant in the United States as a source of fi-
nance for industry than flow-of-funds data indicate.
Average financing ratios, therefore, look similar for the two sources of
data. However, nothing has been said to date about the extent to which these
proportions have changed over time or the correlation between different forms
of finance. Flow-of-funds data are too short (16 observations per country for
the series standardized by the OECD) to provide accurate guidance on either
of these questions. In contrast, company accounting information has been col-
lected for nearly 40 years in the United Kingdom.315 Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development
The graphs in figure 12.1 and 12.2 are based on aggregate company ac-
counting information. In interpreting the graphs it should be borne in mind
that there was a significant change in sampling procedures in 1977.
3 The
graphs suggest the following observations:
Observation 6. U.K. investment has been consistently financed from re-
tentions (91% on average). Bank finance has contributed close to zero (3% on
average) on a net basis.
4
Observation 7. There is a strong inverse relation between the proportion
of expenditure financed from retentions and bank credit.
Confirmation for observation 7 comes from an examination of correlations
between different forms of finance. Table 12.6 records the correlation between
retentions and other sources of finance. Retentions are strongly inversely cor-
related with trade credit and bank credit on both a gross and net basis. The
fact that this is true of gross as well as net bank credit indicates that short-term
financing requirements are satisfied by raising bank loans as well as reducing
cash balances.
Despite only having a short time series available for other countries, table
12.7 reveals a remarkable consistency in this pattern of correlations. Loans




RETENTIONS -*• NET BANK CREDIT
Fig. 12.1: Retentions and net bank credit in the United Kingdom (proportions
of physical investment)









Fig. 12.2: Net issue of securities in the United Kingdom (proportion of
physical investment)






































Note: (I) Gross and net sources are defined as a percentage of total gross and net sources, respectively.
Investment and retentions are defined as a percentage of total gross sources for the first five columns and
retentions is defined as a percentage of total net sources (i.e., physical investment) for the last three
columns. The absolute value of investment is used in the last three columns.
basis (table 12.8), the strong inverse relation with loans remains. However,
with trade credit the correlation is considerably weakened and in many cases
eliminated. This may be just a reflection of the poor quality of trade credit
data in flow-of-funds statistics or an indication of the intracorporate sector
nature of the transaction, not fully revealed by the partial coverage of com-
pany accounts.
Observation 8. Securities markets have declined in significance as
sources of finance for British industry. Trade credit increased in importance at
the end of the 1960s and early 1970s.
5
There is no evidence of financial innovation and deregulation being asso-317 Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development
ciated with a growth in the contribution of market sources of finance.
6 Cross-
sectional evidence suggests that high retention proportions in the United
Kingdom are not merely a consequence of low industrial growth. Two rela-
tively high growth industrial sectors (chemicals and allied firms, and electrical
engineering) recorded financing proportions that were equal to or in excess of
those in other industries (table 12.9).
However, there are marked differences in financing proportions of different
size of firms within industries. Since 1977, the U.K. Department of Trade and
Industry has categorized firms by two size groups: (1) large and (2) medium
and small companies.
7 Table 12.10 below records the following:
8
Observation 9. Small- and medium-sized firms are considerably more re-
liant on external finance than large firms. A smaller proportion of small- than
large-company finance comes from securities markets.
Confirmation for the greater role of banks in small company financing
comes from an examination of stock as well as flow proportions in table
12.11. However, it should be borne in mind that pre- and post-1977 data are
not directly comparable.
Observation 10. Bank (and short-term) finance account for approxi-
mately two-thirds of U.K. companies' total debt but more than five-sixth of
small companies' total debt.

















Correlations between Proportions of Retentions and Proportions of Other





























































































































































Source: Goudie and Meeks (1986); Business Monitors (M3).
Note: All averages are unweighted. The total sample refers to the period 1949-84; chemicals and allied
and electrical engineering industries relate to the period 1949-82.
Table 12.10 Financing Proportions of Large, and Medium- and Small-Sized Companies
in the United Kingdom: Average, 1977-1982
Banks, Short-term Loans
Retentions and Trade Creditors
All companies:
Large 70.9 23.2
Medium and small 52.6 45.7
Chemical companies:
Large 70.5 20.2
Medium and small 50.3 50.5
Electrical companies:
Large 79.4 19.4
Medium and small 60.4 37.4
Source: Business Monitors (M3).
12.3 Alternative Theories of Corporate Finance
There are five classes of theory to which one might turn for an explanation
of the above financing patterns: an irrelevance proposition, transaction costs,
taxation, information and control theories. These will be considered in turn.
12.3.1 Irrelevance
The most widely cited theory of corporate finance is the Modigliani and
Miller proposition. This states that in the presence of perfect and complete
capital markets and in the absence of taxation, corporate valuations, and costs
of capital are independent of firms' capital structures.
At face value, this proposition suggests no underlying determinant of cor-
porate capital structure: the financing of industry is a matter of indifference—
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an accident of history and a product of random influences. However, the sta-
bility of financing patterns over time and countries that has been noted above
argues strongly against the thesis of indifference. The 10 stylized observations
warrant explanation. The indifference proposition does not provide it and can-
not, on its own, be treated as a serious basis for explaining international pat-
terns of corporate finance.
12.3.2 Transaction Costs
Combined with transaction costs or taxation, the theory is much more pow-
erful. The most immediate implication of introducing transaction costs is to
establish a preference for retention over external finance. This is quite con-
sistent with observation 1.
However, the United Kingdom and the United States are generally regarded
as possessing the most highly developed and efficient financial systems of any
country in the world. This proposition rests uneasily alongside the observation
that they have the lowest external financing proportions of any of the countries
in the study (observation 2).
Of course, this may merely reflect a low demand for external finance. But
even the composition of external finance does not correspond with the predic-
tions of a transaction cost theory. The most striking case of international vari-
ations in transaction costs comes from observations on equity markets. In
some countries, stock markets are very small. For example, in France and
Germany, less than 500 companies are quoted. This compares with 1,700 in
Japan and 2,000 in the United Kingdom. French and German market capitali-
zations were 20% of gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 1986 as
against nearly 90% in Japan and the United Kingdom and 50% in the United
States. But, over the period of this study, the United Kingdom and the United
States raised, at best, approximately the same amount of (and probably in
practice rather less) new equity finance for their industries as France and Ja-
pan. It is not merely a matter of transaction costs being a few percentage
Table 12.11 Ratio of Stock of Bank and Short-term Loans to Total Short- and
Long-term Debt: Average 1977-82 (in percentages)
All companies: 66
Large companies 63
Medium and small companies 87
Chemical companies: 47
Large chemical companies 46
Medium and small chemical companies 93
Electrical companies: 73
Large electrical companies 66
Medium and small electrical companies 94
Source: Business Monitors (M3).
Note: Bank loans relate to both short- and long-term loans. The table is not therefore informative
about maturity of debts.320 Colin Mayer
points higher in some countries than others but a difference between compa-
nies having very general access to securities markets in some countries and
very limited access elsewhere.
Turning to bond finance, the surprising feature is how little is raised in a
low-cost, unregulated Eurobond market by European corporations in relation
to domestic issues by North American firms. Over the period of this study
British firms were net purchasers (or repurchasers of bonds) and Canadian
firms significant net issuers. In contrast, according to one report (OECD
1989), direct costs of issuing bonds were relatively high in Canada (1.7% for
large issues) in 1982/83 and low in the United Kingdom (1.1% for large is-
sues).
Finally the notion that ratios of external to internal finance merely reflect
investment demands is undermined by comparisons of low- and high-growth
sectors. Two of the highest-growth sectors (electronics and pharmaceuticals)
had the highest retention proportions.
9 In any event, transaction costs are
probably in general swamped by tax considerations.
12.3.3 Taxation
The first point to note about taxation is that in virtually every country of
this study (with the possible exception of Finland) debt finance has been fa-
vored over equity. This stands in marked contrast to the universal preference
for equity finance (including retentions) over debt finance (observation 1).
More generally, table 12.12 records a poor relation between tax incentives
to employ different forms of finance in the eight countries of the study and
actual financing proportions. On the left-hand side, table 12.12 ranks the tax
incentive to use debt in preference to retentions, new equity issues in prefer-
ence to retentions and new equity in preference to debt. Countries at the top
have the highest incentive to use the first form of finance in each case. On the
right-hand side, it reports actual financing proportions from table 12.1 of this
paper.
The most striking country in the first part of table 12.12 is Germany, which
has the highest incentive to use debt in relation to retentions and the second
lowest use of debt relative to retentions. The United Kingdom has the lowest
debt-to-retentions ratio and the third highest tax incentive. The picture is not
very much better for the ratio of new equity to retentions where Germany now
has the third lowest new equity proportion and the highest incentive and the
United Kingdom still has the lowest proportion and the fourth highest incen-
tive.
It might be objected that comparisons of internal and external financing
proportions and incentives are distorted by transaction costs and investment
requirements. The third part of the table may therefore be regarded as more
instructive. There the most striking case is Finland, which has the highest
incentive to use new equity in preference to debt and the second lowest pro-
portion. The United Kingdom also has a remarkably low new equity propor-321 Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development
Table 12.12 Comparison of Ranking of Eight Countries' Tax Incentives to
Employ Different Forms of Finance with Average Financing Ratios
























































Source: OECD (1986) and table 12.1 of this paper.
"Tax incentives are based on the approach described in King and Fullerton (1984). The OECD
calculations are based on the "fixed-p" case and the results reported above relate to "actual
inflation." Tax incentives are computed as the ratio: '-, where t, is the effective tax rate on
(1 - t)
source of finance /. Tax incentives relate to tax exempt institutional investors and investment in
equipment.
•"Financing proportions are based on table 12.1 in this paper, that is, unweighted average net
financing from flow-of-funds sources. Debt is defined as the sum of short-term securities, loans,
trade credit, and bonds.
tion in the face of a high incentive resulting from its imputation system of
taxation.
There are several objections that can be raised against this type of compari-
son. There are well-known problems in comparing tax incentives across coun-
tries. The figures on which table 12.12 are based come from an OECD exten-
sion of the King-Fullerton (1984) study. These derive tax incentives created
by both corporate and personal taxation on the basis of a Modigliani and
Miller (as against a Miller) equilibrium model of the economy. They do not322 Colin Mayer
take account of cross-border tax incentives to locate, finance, and invest in
different countries, and they have been found to be very sensitive to respecifi-
cations of the model. In addition, the tax incentives in the OECD study relate
to investment in equipment, not structures, and tax-exempt institutions, not
households. In fact, the ranking of incentives is virtually identical for struc-
tures and equipment but is sensitive to the assumed tax rate of investors.
1
0
Finally, the tax incentives refer to one year, 1983, while the financing propor-
tions are averages over the period of the study, 1970-85. Averaging over the
period 1982-84 revealed that the ranking of external to internal financing pro-
portions is similar around the date of measurement of tax incentives. Despite
all these possible sources of inaccuracy, there would have to be a remarkable
level of mismeasurement for taxation to provide a credible explanation for
observed financing proportions.
12.3.4 Information Theories
At first sight, information theories appear to be quite consistent with many
of the results reported in this paper. For example, Myers's (1984) pecking-
order hypothesis suggests that riskless securities (debt) are used in preference
to risky (new equity) and retentions are used in preference to external sources
of finance (observations 1 and 3).
However, the thesis on which the aversion to new equity finance is based
(Myers and Majluf 1984) is an insider-outsider model in which owners are
raising finance from outside investors. It says nothing about the preference of
owners between subscribing themselves in the form of new equity issues and
increasing retentions by cutting dividends. Since rights issues are frequently
employed in Europe (almost all new equity issues are rights issues in France
and the United Kingdom), the sale of equity to external investors does not
arise in many of the countries of this study.
Furthermore there is little support for Myers's prediction that equity finance
is employed at high levels of gearing when debt becomes risky. Even in Japan
and Italy, where gearing levels have been high, there is little new equity fi-
nance (observation 5).
Some aspects of international patterns of corporate finance appear consist-
ent with information models. Observation 3, that bond finance is significant
in Canada and the United States, is consistent with the unusually large number
of bond-rated companies in these countries. In contrast, there are just 30
bond-rated nonfinancial corporations in the United Kingdom, 14 in France,
and 4 in Germany.
However, if anything, this relation between bond finance and ratings raises
something of a puzzle. If it is possible to establish institutions that perform a
pure information-gathering exercise, then what is the role of banks? Informa-
tion theory cannot explain why there is a clear preference for bank finance in
most countries (observation 4) and why bank finance remains important in the
United States.323 Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development
On a similar score, an analysis of credit evaluation procedures of banks in
different countries reveals that the information content of banks is similar in
different countries. There may be two exceptions to this: Germany and Japan.
Both countries have close relations between banks and industry. In Germany,
banks frequently have representatives on the boards of large firms (Edwards
and Fischer 1990). In Japan there is regular interchange of personnel between
banks and firms (see Corbett 1987). But in Germany an unusually small pro-
portion of corporate sector finance comes from banks, while Japan has an
unusually large proportion (observation 5).
Information deficiencies do not provide a convincing explanation for ob-
served international patterns of corporate finance on their own. There is an
aspect of the relation between institutions and firms that information theories
fail to capture. The next subsection suggests that this has to do with control
rather than monitoring of firms.
12.3.5 Control theories
The previous subsection has noted that agent-principal problems can arise
where information asymmetries exist. Imperfect information is one but not
the only explanation for why agent-principal problems may arise. Problems
of verifiability and enforceability of contracts as well as observability may
undermine the writing and implementation of complete contracts. Alterna-
tively, writing complete contracts may simply be too expensive.
In the absence of complete contracts, the allocation of control over the de-
ployment of assets matters. Those who control the employment of assets
should be residual claimants. The amount of finance that those who are not in
control are willing to provide will be dependent on the amount that they can
realize if they do take control (see Mayer 1989a).
Control theory is most closely associated with Philippe Aghion and Patrick
Bolton." They argue that the amount of debt finance that a firm will choose is
dependent on the point at which it is optimal for control to be transferred from
entrepreneur to creditor. Thus external financing is dependent on the relative
productivity of creditors and entrepreneurs in particular states of nature.
More generally, control theory suggests that external financing is dependent
on (see Mayer 1989b): (i) the managerial ability of creditors; (ii) the nature of
assets (the higher their realizable value, the higher is the creditor's reservation
valuation and the greater is the amount of external finance that is available);
(iii) the costs of coordinating creditors and the costs of bankruptcy and liqui-
dation; and (iv) other nonfinancial controls that investors can exert on firms.
More specifically, control theories lead to the following predictions.
PREDICTION 1. Gearing levels will be high where the value of assets under
creditor management is high.
PREDICTION 2. Assets that are not specific to their current employment
will attract more external finance.
PREDICTION 3. Where the costs of organizing external control are high,
there will be little external finance.324 Colin Mayer
PREDICTION 4. The relation between control and finance is weakened
where interests of investor and manager do not diverge.
The observations of the previous section can be assessed in relation to these
predictions. The first five observations on the dominant role of retentions, low
contributions from securities markets, and the importance of banks in some
countries are consistent with predictions 1 and 3. If external intervention is
costly because creditors are either poor managers or difficult to organize, then
own finance will dominate (observation 1) and be particularly large in coun-
tries in which management and finance are separated (observation 2). Credi-
tors that are dispersed and difficult to organize will play an especially small
role (observation 3). Instead, finance will come from intermediaries (obser-
vation 4) that are closely integrated into their corporate sectors (observa-
tion 5).
The relation between finance and control is particularly evident in the pro-
vision of working capital. The main providers of working capital (banks and
trade creditors—observation 7) also have the most direct claim on assets in
the event of default (fixed and floating charges). The ability to trigger these
claims automatically with little direct managerial input means that institutions
can smooth cash flows even where their longer term involvement is small
(comparison of observations 2 and 7).
Predictions 2 and 3 help to account for observations 9 and 10. Small and
newly formed companies have a low intangible (goodwill) to tangible valua-
tion ratio. Therefore a smaller proportion of their assets are specific to their
current employment, and investors can realize a larger proportion of their on-
going value in the event of default. As a consequence, the external financing
ratio of small companies is higher than average (observation 9) and finance is
provided by investors who can take control at low cost (observation 10). By
way of a corollary, it is worth noting that capital market deficiencies will be
particularly pronounced in firms with a high proportion of intangible assets
(i.e. companies involved in substantial research and development (R&D) pro-
grams) and few own resources. This is consistent with the Schumpetarian hy-
pothesis that product market dominance is required to provide finance for
R&D.
As for the other two observations, the apparent constancy of financing pat-
terns (observation 6) supports the emphasis that is placed on structural factors
(quality of management, nature of assets, and costs of creditor coordination)
by control models. The decline in the proportion of certain classes of external
finance (observation 8) probably then reflects a shift in the balance of corpo-
rate and investor control as the complexity of corporate organizational ar-
rangements increases in the United Kingdom.
Observations on international patterns of corporate finance are therefore
suggestive of the relevance of control theories of finance. However, there is
one observation that at least at first sight appears inconsistent with control
theories. Despite having a banking system that is closely integrated with its325 Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development
corporate sector, German industry raises a comparatively modest proportion
of its finance in the form of loans (observation 5).
1
2 Prediction 4 was that the
relation between finance and control would break down where investor and
management interests do not diverge. This description, it is suggested, is ap-
plicable to German bank-investor relations.
Schonfield (1965), in his classic account of the German financial system,
saw banks as the prefects of German industry. Their power derived from their
equity investments, their proxy votes, and their representation on supervisory
boards (the Aufsichtsrat). Knight (1988) views the relation as more advisory
than dictatorial and echoes the sentiments of German bankers when he con-
cludes, "The evidence then points to the banks as sometimes providing com-
panies with independent, well-informed and well-connected nonexecutive
chairmen able to make a powerful contribution to the board's performance"
(15). Consensus or command, the need for financial control is lessened by the
other instruments that German banks have at their disposal.
12.4 Conclusions and Policy Implications
A quite striking observation to emerge from the empirical analysis is that in
no country do securities markets contribute a large proportion of corporate
sector financing. In some countries, the average net contribution was close to
or less than zero. Equity markets are particularly deficient in this respect. That
is not to say that equity markets do not perform an important function. They
may promote allocative efficiency by providing prices that guide the allocation
of resources or productive efficiency through reallocating existing resources
via, for example, the takeover process. But in terms of aggregate corporate
sector funding, their function appears limited. Instead, a majority of external
finance comes from banks. Why?
Neither transaction costs nor taxation were found to provide adequate de-
scriptions of corporate financing patterns in different countries. One interpre-
tation for the preponderance of bank finance is that financial intermediaries
perform a central function in diminishing one of the most serious deficiencies
of financial markets: asymmetries in information. According to this view,
banks play an important role in collecting and processing information that
markets are unable to do or can do only at high cost.
There is almost certainly a large element of truth in this story. But the anal-
ysis of the section 12.3 suggested that imperfect information is not an ade-
quate description on its own. Information gathering can be quite effectively
performed by institutions other than banks. Furthermore, the distinguishing
feature of banks in different countries does not appear to be the nature of or
the way in which they collect information.
Instead, it is the extent to which and the form in which institutions influence
the activities of firms that appear to show marked variations across institutions
and countries. Is control direct in the form of representation on the boards of326 Colin Mayer
firms or indirect in the form of takeovers? Do financial institutions or individ-
ual shareholders initiate changes in control? How easy is it to form coalitions
of shareholders or bond holders and how serious are free-rider problems of
control?
The analysis in the previous section suggested that control theories provide
a good basis for understanding the 10 stylized observations of this paper. They
emphasize the managerial functions of financial institutions and suggest that
the central role of banks comes from their ability to intervene and take control
at comparatively low cost.
If this is right, then the implication of both the empirical observation of a
preponderance of external finance coming from banks and control models of
corporate finance is that banks may be superior to markets in promoting eco-
nomic development and growth. This may be particularly true in the early
stages of development of both economies and firms before reputations have
been established and adequate incentives exist to bring borrowers' and lend-
ers' interests into line. In the longer term intermediaries may be less central
to the development of firms.
13 But in the early stages of the growth of firms
and economies an efficient banking system may be an essential requirement
for expansion. During these periods, securities markets are unlikely to be ef-
fective substitutes.
Appendix A
Alternative Sources of Data
There are two sources of information on corporate financing: flow-of-funds
statistics and company accounts. Company accounts are available on an indi-
vidual firm basis; flow-of-funds are aggregated across sectors. For this pur-
pose, the relevant flow-of-funds sector is nonfinancial enterprises.
The primary advantage of flow-of-funds data is that their coverage is com-
prehensive. In contrast, company accounts are only available for a limited
number of firms and samples are frequently a small proportion (by number)
of all enterprises. On the other hand, definitions of enterprise sectors differ
across countries. In theory, Standard National Accounting (SNA) conventions
stipulate that private and public corporations should be included in the nonfi-
nancial enterprise sector. Unincorporated businesses should be included in the
household, not the nonfinancial enterprise sector. In practice, as table 12A.I
records, only Canada abides by the SNA definition.
The major problem with flow-of-funds data is that they are collected from a
variety of different sources. For example, in the United Kingdom, profits are
largely based on tax returns to the Inland Revenue and loans and securities327 Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development
Table 12A. 1 Definitions of Nonfinancial Enterprise Sectors
Country Definition
Canada As for SNA
Finland Includes unincorporated enterprises
France Excludes large public corporations
Germany Includes unincorporated enterprises
Italy Excludes some public corporations
Japan Excludes large public corporations
United Kingdom Excludes public corporations
United States Includes unincorporated enterprises, excludes public corporations
issued on returns by financial institutions to the Bank of England. As a con-
sequence, sources and uses do not, in general, balance and a statistical adjust-
ment is required to reconcile entries.
1
4
A fundamental distinction between flow-of-funds statistics and company
accounts is that the former only relate to domestic activities while the latter
are constructed on a worldwide basis including foreign subsidiaries. Thus is-
sues of bond and equity securities are restricted to those made on domestic
markets in flow-of-funds accounts but include issues on all markets in com-
pany accounts. Company accounts are therefore more suitable for analyzing
how different countries' corporate sectors fund themselves, but flow-of-funds
allow the contribution of a domestic sector's financial system to be identified.
Overall there is a presumption that company accounts are more accurate
than flow-of-funds. However, company accounting analyses are lengthy exer-
cises, frequently involving the manipulation of very large data banks. As yet
comprehensive information is only available on the United Kingdom. Even
here, there are serious discontinuities in aggregate series. For example, in
1977 the sample of U.K. company accounts was extended from firms quoted
on the stock exchange to a representative sample of all companies.
For other countries, aggregate company accounts constructed by the OECD
have had to be used. These suffer from similar discrepancies in the definitions
of sectors to flow-of-funds. Eventually, comprehensive accounting informa-
tion on the five countries of the study will be available which will provide a
greater degree of comparability than has been available to date. In the mean-
time, more emphasis is placed in this article on flow-of-funds sources. The
relative merits of company accounts and flow-of-funds are summarized in
Table 12A.2.328 Colin Mayer
Table 12A.2 A Comparison of Flow-of-Funds and Company Accounts as
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Derivation of Financial Statistics
This study differs from previous international comparisons in both the data it
uses and the way in which those data are presented.
The Data
Most existing international comparisons use stock data from company bal-
ance sheets to derive gearing levels. Two serious objections have been raised
against this approach. First, in the absence of inflation corrections, capital
stock and equity valuations can be substantially underrecorded. In Japan re-
valuations of company accounts are uncommon and in Germany they are for-
bidden by law. As Aoki (1984) has noted, the failure of Japanese accounts to
revalue assets, in particular land, has resulted in Japanese gearing levels being
considerably overstated. Second, book values of assets and reserves are sen-
sitive to depreciation schedules.
1
5 Accounting conventions on depreciation
vary appreciably across countries, partly in response to differences in corpo-
rate tax regimes.
Problems with accounting valuations have led several authors to advocate
the use of market valuations. However, consideration of the use of market
valuations suggests a more fundamental objection to stock measures. Market
valuations respond not only to inflows and outflows of new financial resources
but also to changes in valuations of existing resources. Valuations serve many
useful purposes but do not assist in measuring financial flows.
To see this, consider a company that purchases land on the uncertain pros-
pect of striking oil. Suppose that the land costs £1 million and the company
funds this entirely from a bank loan. Assuming no other resources, its initial
gearing is 100%. If the company subsequently strikes oil and the valuation of
the land rises to £100 million, its gearing level will drop to 1%. If it does not,329 Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development
then values of both land and debt fall to £100,000 and the company is insol-
vent. The outcome of explorations appropriately affects valuations of debt and
equity but does not alter the way in which the original investment was fi-
nanced.
For this reason flows are used in preference to stocks. One implication of
using flows rather than stocks is that retentions are defined on a gross of de-
preciation rather than a net basis. The reason for this is that by subtracting
depreciation, financing is being distorted by accountants' estimates of valua-
tion changes. These should not be part of a sources of funds account and are
in any event inconsistently measured across countries.
Data Presentation
All financing proportions are recorded on a net basis: acquisition of finan-
cial assets are subtracted from increases in corresponding liabilities. The ra-
tionale behind using net financing proportions is that aggregate corporate
financing figures attempt to answer the question, in what form did the nonfi-
nancial corporate sector as a whole fund its physical investment? Intracorpor-
ate sector flows should net out, and offsetting flows should be eliminated.
Thus, for example, from the perspective of the company sector as a whole,
new equity issues by one company are offset by repurchases of equity of equal
magnitude by another company. Any other approach leads to nonsensical re-
sults.
Consider, for example, a company that is required to make a compensating
deposit of £30 for £100 of finance raised. Compensating deposits are common
in Japan and the United States. The company has raised £100 gross but only
£70 net. But suppose the company voluntarily holds £40 in deposits; should it
be treated as having raised £70 or £60? Clearly net financing raised from the
bank in this period has been £60. It may choose at a later date to increase this
to £70 but the additional £10 has to be attributed to that period in which finan-
cial assets are reduced.
Economic theory does not currently allow reductions in stocks of financial
assets to be distinguished from increases in financial assets. When a robust
theoretical distinction is available then separate classification will be appro-
priate. Control theory offers just such a distinction by distinguishing finance
by degrees of intervention. Ironically then, the theory that this paper empha-
sizes will in time invalidate the netting approach that has been advocated here.
However, at the current time the appropriate null hypotheses that should guide
the construction of financing data are Modigliani and Miller irrelevance prop-
ositions and corporate taxation models.
In moving from single projects to company finance, flows in different time
periods have to be aggregated. The most straightforward approach is simply
to average financing proportions. However, that does not take account of
amounts of finance raised and so puts undue emphasis on periods of low in-330 Colin Mayer
vestment. Instead, averages could be created by revaluing flows of different
classes of finance to constant prices and then aggregating them. If a capital
goods price index is used for revaluations, this is equivalent to weighting fi-
nancing proportions by gross levels of investment at constant prices. An ap-
pealing alternative is to weight by depreciated values of investment at con-
stant prices. This answers the question, what would the capital structure of a
company be if it replicated its existing capital stock using the same sources of
finance as it employed in the past? The average is calculated as follows:
5>, x a,,r) x (pjyp*)
T i j ,
= i\y=i /
where I{ = amount of type j finance raised in period t (j = 1, . . . 7, t = 1,
. . . T); at T = depreciated value in period T of a unit investment in period t;
P
kt = capital goods price index in t.
Notes
1. See, e.g., Carrington and Edwards (1979) and Rybczynski (1988).
2. There is a strong similarity between the financing proportions recorded for the
United States in table 12.3 and those reported in Goldsmith (1965) for earlier periods.
Goldsmith reports the following for the period 1946 to 1958: retentions, 58.2; loans,
25.7; bonds, 9.6; equities, 6.4.
3. See App. A for details.
4. It is only slightly in excess of this on a gross basis—6% on average.
5. Comparisons of financing proportions in n. 2 above with table 12.3 suggests that
a similar decline has occurred in the United States over the second World War period.
Taggart (1985) demonstrates that the decline has been a long-run one. He reports the
following financing proportions for the U.S. nonfinancial corporations since the turn
of the century:
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6. That observation is not dependent on netting uses from sources. Issues of long-
term liabilities and shares averaged as follows:
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-84
Long-term liabilities 7.5 10.8 5.6 -.7
Shares 11.1 14.9 8.5 8.0331 Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development
However, it should be borne in mind that pre- and post-1977 data are not directly
comparable.
7. For the period shown in table 12.10 large firms are defined as those with capital
employed of more than £4.16 million.
8. Goldsmith (1958) records a similar distinction between small and large firms in








300 large corporations 59.1 7.2 14.1 8.1 11.3
All other corporations 53.0 22.7 12.6 5.0 6.8
9. Research on individual company data in several countries, not reported here,
confirms that electronic and pharmaceutical firms generally use little external finance.
10. The orderings of France and Italy in the debt: retentions comparison and of
Japan and the United States in the new equity: debt comparison are reversed when
investment in structures is considered instead of investment in equipment. Otherwise
the orderings are unaffected.
11. See Aghion and Bolton (1988). See also Hart and Moore (1989) and William-
son (1988).
12. There are, of course, numerous other services that German universal banks pro-
vide for their customers, for example, bond and equity issuing facilities, and portfolio
management services for investors. In addition, banks were probably a more important
source of finance in earlier periods.
13. See Diamond (1989) for a theory of choice between bank and bond finance that
is consistent with this.
14. There is no statistical adjustment in Germany. Instead, adjustments are made to
recorded items to eliminate any discrepancy.
15. For a convincing demonstration of this point see Fisher and McGowan (1983).
See also Harcourt (1965).
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